Fighting an Uphill Battle: Reconciling Unpaid Contributions of Multiemployer Pension Plans with the Bankruptcy Code\u27s Defalcation Provision by Griffin, Nicole Adalaide
Emory Bankruptcy Developments Journal 
Volume 33 
Issue 1 A Tribute to Professor Grant W. Newton 
2016 
Fighting an Uphill Battle: Reconciling Unpaid Contributions of 
Multiemployer Pension Plans with the Bankruptcy Code's 
Defalcation Provision 
Nicole Adalaide Griffin 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.emory.edu/ebdj 
Recommended Citation 
Nicole A. Griffin, Fighting an Uphill Battle: Reconciling Unpaid Contributions of Multiemployer Pension 
Plans with the Bankruptcy Code's Defalcation Provision, 33 Emory Bankr. Dev. J. 313 (2016). 
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.emory.edu/ebdj/vol33/iss1/10 
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Emory Law Scholarly Commons. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in Emory Bankruptcy Developments Journal by an authorized editor of Emory Law 
Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact law-scholarly-commons@emory.edu. 
GRIFFIN GALLEYSPROOFS2 12/15/2016 3:16 PM 
 
FIGHTING AN UPHILL BATTLE: RECONCILING UNPAID 
CONTRIBUTIONS OF MULTIEMPLOYER PENSION PLANS 
WITH THE BANKRUPTCY CODE’S 
DEFALCATION PROVISION 
Five circuit courts have determined whether an employer’s unpaid 
contributions due under an employee benefit plan can be classified as plan 
assets under ERISA. When unpaid contributions are plan assets, the individual 
exercising authority or control over the assets is imputed fiduciary status 
under ERISA and, in turn, owes certain fiduciary duties and obligations to the 
employee benefit funds. If the fiduciary fails to make the required 
contributions, thereby breaching his or her duties under ERISA, then he or she 
becomes personally liable for the unpaid contributions. In bankruptcy, this 
result means that the unpaid contributions would be a nondischargeable debt if 
the court holds the individual liable for defalcation. 
In 2005, the Tenth Circuit was the first circuit to address whether unpaid 
contributions can be plan assets in a bankruptcy proceeding. Subsequently, in 
2007 and 2015, the Sixth and Ninth Circuits decided this issue within the 
bankruptcy context and elected to either follow the Tenth Circuit’s guidance or 
deviate slightly to reach an identical final result, making the unpaid 
contributions a dischargeable debt.  
A circuit split now exists. On the one hand, the two circuits that decided 
this issue in nonbankruptcy proceedings have either (1) held an individual 
liable as an ERISA fiduciary for the unpaid contributions; or (2) recognized 
the potential to hold an individual liable for the unpaid contributions under the 
right set of circumstances. On the other hand, the three circuits that decided 
this issue in bankruptcy have either (1) failed to classify unpaid contributions 
as plan assets; or (2) failed to extend ERISA’s definition of “fiduciary” into 
the bankruptcy context, ultimately finding that the debts are dischargeable in 
bankruptcy. 
This Comment seeks to reconcile the circuit split by proposing a three-step 
approach that will allow courts determining this issue in bankruptcy 
proceedings to mirror their counterparts while still protecting and preserving 
the spirit of the Bankruptcy Code. Adopting this approach will bring clarity to 
a muddled and complex area of the law and ensure that dishonest debtors are 
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held accountable under § 523(a)(4) for their willful and conscious disregard of 
the fiduciary duties owed to dependent employees. 
INTRODUCTION 
Millions of Americans depend on employer contributions to employee 
benefit funds as a means of achieving their retirement savings goals.1 
Employer contributions represent “more than 35% of the total contributions on 
average to an employee’s workplace savings account.”2 Employees place such 
a high value on employer contributions that 43% admitted “they would settle 
for lower pay if it meant they received a higher employer contribution to their 
retirement plan accounts.”3 Further, “only 13% [of employees] sa[id] they 
would take a job with no company match, even if it came with a higher pay 
level.”4  
Dependence upon employer contributions may help explain why 64% of 
Americans are concerned about not having enough money for retirement.5 
Gallup notes that “[s]ince [it] began polling Americans in 2001 about their 
financial concerns, a majority have continually been worried about not being 
able to afford retirement—the top overall concern in each of those 16 years.”6 
These statistics suggest “that saving for retirement disquiets Americans in both 
good and bad economic times.”7 When employers fail to hold up their end of 
the bargain and become unable or unwilling to make the promised 
contributions, employees are often left frustrated and in need of legal 
assistance.8 
With respect to multiemployer pension plans, “the amount of the 
employer’s contribution is usually set by a collective bargaining agreement 
 
 1 See Introduction to Multiemployer Plans, PENSION BENEFIT GUARANTY CORP., http://www.pbgc.gov/ 
prac/multiemployer/introduction-to-multiemployer-plans.html (last visited Sept. 21, 2016); 
Kevin McGuinness, Employer Contributions Important to Employee Retirement Savings, PLANSPONSOR 
(Aug. 12, 2014), http://www.plansponsor.com/Employer_Contributions_Important_to_Employee_Retirement_ 
Savings.aspx. 
 2 McGuinness, supra note 1. 
 3 Id. 
 4 Id. 
 5 See Justin McCarthy, Americans’ Financial Worries Edge Up in 2016, GALLUP (Apr. 28, 2016), 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/191174/americans-financial-worries-edge-2016.aspx. 
 6 Id. 
 7 Andrew Dugan, Retirement Remains Americans’ Top Financial Worry, GALLUP (Apr. 22, 2014), 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/168626/retirement-remains-americans-topfinancial-worry.aspx. 
 8 See Introduction to Multiemployer Plans, supra note 1. 
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that specifies a contribution formula (such as $3 per hour worked by each 
employee covered by the agreement) and further provides that contributions 
must be paid to the plan on a monthly basis.”9 If an employer fails to make the 
required contributions, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act 
(“ERISA”) “permits the plan to sue and obtain the delinquency plus interest, 
liquidated damages, court costs, and reasonable attorney fees.”10 Additionally, 
many courts have imputed fiduciary duties to employers in their individual 
capacities for failing to make the required contributions where the governing 
agreements specifically classify all employer contributions as plan assets.11 
Despite such rulings, the majority rule is that an employer’s unpaid 
contributions are not plan assets.12 When the unpaid contributions are not plan 
assets, the employer is not liable for the contributions as an ERISA fiduciary.13 
The circuit courts are divided on the issue of what constitutes a plan asset 
when dealing with unpaid contributions. Three circuits have held that the 
unpaid contributions themselves can be a plan asset.14 These courts found that 
the individuals who had failed to make contributions to the employee benefit 
funds may be ERISA fiduciaries.15 Two other circuits have held that the 
contractual right to bring a claim with respect to the unpaid contributions is the 
plan asset; the unpaid amounts themselves are not.16 These circuits refrained 
from imputing ERISA fiduciary status to the employers.17 
When this issue arises in the context of a bankruptcy proceeding, the circuit 
courts split once again, but in a different way. While the circuits deciding this 
issue outside of bankruptcy interpret ERISA broadly, expanding the traditional 
understanding of what it means to be a “fiduciary,”18 the circuits deciding this 
issue within the bankruptcy context recognize fiduciary status in very limited 
 
 9 Id. 
 10 Id.; see also 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g) (2012).  
 11 See, e.g., Bricklayers & Allied Craftworkers Local 2 v. Moulton Masonry & Constr., LLC, 779 F.3d 
182, 184 (2d Cir. 2015); ITPE Pension Fund v. Hall, 334 F.3d 1011, 1012 (11th Cir. 2003). 
 12 See Cline v. Indus. Maint. Eng’g & Contracting Co., 200 F.3d 1233, 1234 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 13 See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A)(i). 
 14 See Moulton Masonry, 779 F.3d at 184–88; Hall, 334 F.3d at 1012; see also Bd. of Trs. v. Bucci (In re 
Bucci), 493 F.3d 635, 642 (6th Cir. 2007) (“For the sake of argument, the court will assume that the unpaid 
employer contributions here qualified as ERISA plan assets.”). 
 15 See Moulton Masonry, 779 F.3d at 188–89; Hall, 334 F.3d at 1012–16. 
 16 See Bos v. Bd. of Trs., 795 F.3d 1006, 1011 (9th Cir. 2015); Navarre v. Luna (In re Luna), 406 F.3d 
1192, 1204 (10th Cir. 2005). 
 17 See Bos, 795 F.3d at 1010–12; In re Luna, 406 F.3d at 1203–04. 
 18 See Moulton Masonry, 779 F.3d at 188–89; Hall, 334 F.3d at 1012–15. 
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circumstances and interpret the definition of “fiduciary” narrowly.19 In other 
words, courts have been reluctant to impute fiduciary duties to employers 
when bankruptcy proceedings accompany the otherwise identical factual 
scenarios.20 Thus, when a company owner in control of company finances files 
for bankruptcy in his or her individual capacity, the unpaid contributions are 
often dischargeable. This result leaves employees without a remedy.21 Because 
of the increasing amount of unpaid contributions and inconsistent judicial 
opinions, support for private pension reform has been rising steadily.22 
While the purpose of the Bankruptcy Code (the “Code”) is to provide a 
fresh start for the debtor by discharging contractual debts, thereby relieving the 
debtor of those obligations, the Code does not provide such relief for dishonest 
debtors who have engaged in fraudulent conduct.23 This concept is hardly 
novel, and one would be hard pressed to find a court that would hold 
otherwise. By deviating from the reasoning of their counterparts, however, 
courts deciding this issue in bankruptcy are sidestepping ERISA and 
facilitating discharges for potentially dishonest debtors who have breached 
their fiduciary duties to employees. Thus, the conflict that the courts have 
created is illogical and further complicates an already complex area of the law. 
Although ERISA plans “are just too complex and varied for everyone to 
understand” and “[e]mployees and plan participants cannot be expected to 
know all the ins and outs governing their ERISA plans,”24 it should be 
understood that “fiduciaries—the people who run and manage the plans—have 
certain obligations to plan participants . . . [and] when they breach their 
fiduciary duty—employees can file an ERISA lawsuit to attempt to recover 
their missing funds.”25 By refraining to impute fiduciary duties to employers 
 
 19 See Bos, 795 F.3d at 1010–12; In re Bucci, 493 F.3d at 637 (embracing the exception to the general 
rule that unpaid contributions are not plan assets but declining to recognize “a debtor’s status as an ERISA 
fiduciary as alone being sufficient . . . for purposes of § 523(a)(4)”); In re Luna, 406 F.3d at 1203–04. 
 20 See, e.g., Bos, 795 F.3d at 1010–12; In re Bucci, 493 F.3d at 641–43; In re Luna, 406 F.3d at 1197. 
 21 See, e.g., Bos, 795 F.3d at 1012; In re Bucci, 493 F.3d at 637–38; In re Luna, 406 F.3d at 1197.  
 22 See generally Mark Miller, Why Congress Needs to Reform Multi-Employer Pension Plans Now, 
REUTERS (July 31, 2014, 9:10 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/07/31/us-column-miller-pensions-
idUSKBN0G01IM20140731#KXvl2fggeif3rgpE.97 (explaining that “[p]olicymakers, legislators, business and 
labor groups have debated the issue for two years . . . [i]f Congress doesn’t act this year, it is very likely that 
major plans will fail and the multi-employer system will collapse”). 
 23 See Thomas H. Jackson, The Fresh-Start Policy in Bankruptcy Law, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1393, 1393 
(1985). 
 24 Heidi Turner, Understanding ERISA Laws Complicated to Understand, 
LAWYERSANDSETTLEMENTS.COM (Aug. 12, 2012), https://www.lawyersandsettlements.com/articles/stock_ 
option/erisa-plan-lawsuit-retirement-employee-3-17970.html#.VoRlm5OAOko. 
 25 Id. 
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who file for bankruptcy, courts have further, and unnecessarily, muddled 
ERISA law. If courts were to adopt a systematic approach that takes into 
account the totality of the circumstances surrounding each individual case, it 
would produce two effects. First, courts would be able to hold individual 
employers accountable for breaching their fiduciary duties. Second, courts 
would still be able to preserve the public policy concern of protecting honest 
debtors in bankruptcy proceedings. 
This Comment will focus primarily on the bankruptcy component of the 
circuit split and will remain agnostic to all other aspects of the split. That is to 
say, this Comment will assume it is possible for unpaid contributions to be 
plan assets. This Comment will begin by discussing the history of 
multiemployer pension plans, while also providing insight on ERISA reforms. 
Next, this Comment will compare the broad interpretation “fiduciary” receives 
under ERISA with the narrow interpretation “fiduciary” receives under the 
Code by discussing the decisions of the circuit courts that have decided 
whether an individual can be held personally liable for an employer’s unpaid 
contributions. Finally, this Comment will propose a three-step approach courts 
should adopt when determining the dischargeability of unpaid contributions. 
First, when the governing agreement between the parties unambiguously 
categorizes unpaid contributions as plan assets, courts should defer to the 
contractual intent of the parties and recognize unpaid contributions as plan 
assets. Second, courts should presume that “fiduciary” has a consistent 
meaning under both ERISA and the Code. Third, courts should determine the 
dischargeability of unpaid contributions under § 523(a)(4) in a bankruptcy 
proceeding on a case-by-case basis after evaluating the totality of the 
circumstances. 
I. BACKGROUND 
Pension law is no stranger to the old adage, “It gets worse before it gets 
better.” A series of incidents arose throughout the twentieth century that set the 
stage for ERISA’s enactment in 1974. Before discussing these incidents, 
however, it is important to understand the structure of a multiemployer pension 
plan. 
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A multiemployer pension plan is a “retirement plan negotiated by a union 
with a group of employers typically in the same industry.”26 Multiemployer 
plans are most prominent among either small companies that do not establish 
their own employee benefit plans or “industries in which, because of seasonal 
or irregular employment and high labor mobility, few workers would qualify 
under an individual company’s plan if one were established.”27 These plans 
“allow employees who move among employers within unionized industries—
such as trucking, construction and grocery-store chains—to participate in the 
same retirement plan negotiated under either separate or common collective 
bargaining agreements.”28 The collective bargaining agreements (“CBA”) 
govern the terms of multiemployer plans and state “how much the employers 
must contribute to the plans for their employees.”29 Under most agreements, 
employers “participating in the same multiemployer plan often make equal 
contributions.”30 Thus, if two employers contribute to the same plan and one 
stops making payments, the plan could become underfunded quickly.31 The 
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, a federal agency created under ERISA 
to maintain private pension plans, estimates that “multiemployer pension plans 
covering about 1.5 million people are severely underfunded.”32 One major 
contributing factor to the insolvency of these plans is company bankruptcies.33 
The earliest multiemployer pension plans were not created by CBAs.34 
Instead, they were “solely administered by unions” and served to strengthen 
the power of unions.35 With little federal regulation, unions were able to abuse 
their control over plans in two ways. First, unions would opportunistically 
access plan components during emergencies such as workers’ strikes. Second, 
 
 26 Facts About Multiemployer Pension Plan Funding, PENSION RTS. CENT. (May 29, 2014), http://www. 
pensionrights.org/publications/fact-sheet/facts-about-multiemployer-pension-plan-funding (last visited Jan. 23, 
2016). 
 27 EMPLOYEE BENEFIT RESEARCH INSTITUTE, MULTIEMPLOYER PLANS (2009), https://www.ebri.org/pdf/ 
publications/books/fundamentals/fund14.pdf. 
 28 Overview of Multiemployer Plans, IRS, https://www.irs.gov/irm/part7/irm_07-011-006.html#d0e107 
(last visited Jan. 23, 2016). 
 29 Facts About Multiemployer Pension Plan Funding, supra note 26.  
 30 EMPLOYEE BENEFIT RESEARCH INSTITUTE, supra note 27. 
 31 See Facts About Multiemployer Pension Plan Funding, supra note 26. 
 32 PBGC Report Shows Improvement in Single-Employer Plans, but Underscores Increased Risks to 
Some Multiemployer Plans, PENSION BENEFIT GUARANTY CORP. (June 30, 2014), http://www.pbgc.gov/ 
news/press/releases/pr14-08.html. 
 33 Facts About Multiemployer Pension Plan Funding, supra note 26. 
 34 Harriet Weinstein & William Wiatrowski, Multiemployer Pension Plans, MONTHLY LAB. REV., Spring 
1999, at 19, 20, http://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/cwc/multiemployer-pension-plans.pdf. 
 35 Id. 
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they would mandate that employees be in “good standing” within the union to 
gain access to the plans.36 Thus, employees were at the mercy of unions, and 
they had nowhere else to turn to secure future benefits for themselves and their 
families.37 
Following World War II, the federal government implemented several 
policies to curb inflation that ended up sparking pension reform and 
“spur[ring] the creation of private pension plans.”38 The first of these policies 
was the passage of “favorable tax regulations [that] made pension plans less 
expensive for employers by allowing them to deduct, as a business expense, 
contributions made to pension plans when computing their tax returns.”39 In 
addition, “wage stabilization efforts imposed a ceiling on wage increases to 
reduce inflationary pressures, but employee benefits, including pensions, were 
exempt.”40 Perhaps most importantly, however, in 1948 the Seventh Circuit 
affirmed the National Labor Relations Board’s order mandating that pension 
and insurance benefits be determined through collective bargaining.41 With this 
decision, the playing field between employers and employees was finally 
beginning to even out. 
In the midst of progress, 1964 brought the infamous collapse of the 
Studebaker-Packard Corporation and “the inadequately funded pension plan 
did not have enough assets to finance the benefits owed to over 7,000 
employees.”42 When Studebaker fell, “a number of abuses in pension plan 
structure became public.”43 For example, “[u]nreasonably high vesting 
thresholds prevented long-time workers from qualifying for benefits” and the 
pension rules defined “unbroken service” too narrowly.44 Furthermore, “courts 
[had been] uph[olding] practices of employers by reserving their rights to 
modify, decrease, or deny benefits or eliminate pensions at will.”45 These 
practices allowed employers to escape “a number of liabilities by asserting in 
 
 36 Id. 
 37 See id. 
 38 Sarah Steers, ERISA History, JURIST (Oct. 4, 2013, 12:01 PM), http://jurist.org/feature/2013/10/erisa-
history.php. 
 39 Weinstein & Wiatrowski, supra note 34, at 20. 
 40 Id. 
 41 Inland Steel Co. v. NLRB, 170 F.2d 247, 251, 255 (7th Cir. 1948); see also Weinstein & Wiatrowski, 
supra note 34, at 20.  
 42 Steers, supra note 38. 
 43 Karen A. Zurlo, Private Pension Protections Since ERISA: The Expanded Role of the Individual, 39 J. 
SOC. & SOC. WELFARE 49, 53 (2012). 
 44 Id. 
 45 Id. 
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plan documents that workers were claiming benefits against the plan, and not 
against the assets of the corporation.”46 Thus, courts were getting it wrong and 
many commentators suggested that “Studebaker’s bankruptcy highlighted the 
need for federal legislation to amend pension plan abuses and protect workers 
from corporate bankruptcy.”47 The stage was now set for ERISA’s debut. 
A. ERISA’s Application in Nonbankruptcy Proceedings 
Congress enacted ERISA in 1974 to set minimum standards for voluntarily 
established pension plans and to provide protection for individuals in these 
plans.48 In other words, an employer does not have to set up a pension plan for 
its employees. If the employer chooses to do so, however, “it is held to certain 
specific minimum standards.”49 Federal courts have agreed that ERISA is “a 
remedial statute deserving of broad construction.”50 ERISA “applies to 
virtually all private-sector corporations, partnerships, and proprietorships, 
including non-profit corporations—regardless of their size or number of 
employees.”51  
ERISA requires that a voluntary pension plan contain certain provisions, 
including 
provid[ing] participants with plan information . . . about plan features 
and funding; provid[ing] fiduciary responsibilities for those who 
manage and control plan assets; require[ing] plans to establish a 
grievance and appeals process . . . and giv[ing] participants the right 
to sue for benefits and breaches of fiduciary duty.52  
ERISA defines a “fiduciary” as any individual that “exercises any 
discretionary authority or discretionary control respecting management of such 
plan or exercises any authority or control respecting management or 
 
 46 Id. 
 47 Steers, supra note 38; see Zurlo, supra note 43, at 52–53. 
 48 Health Plans & Benefits: ERISA, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, http://www.dol.gov/dol/topic/health-
plans/erisa.htm (last visited July 13, 2016).  
 49 Steers, supra note 38. 
 50 ITPE Pension Fund v. Hall, 334 F.3d 1011, 1015 (11th Cir. 2003); see Teamsters Joint Council No. 83 
v. Centra, Inc., 947 F.2d 115, 123 (4th Cir. 1991); see also LoPresti v. Terwilliger, 126 F.3d 34, 40 (2d Cir. 
1997) (holding that an individual who signed checks and decided when creditors were paid was personally 
liable as an ERISA fiduciary). 
 51 Ryan McParland, ERISA: A Statute’s History, Purposes, and Progression, NY ST. BAR ASS’N: L. 
STUDENT CONNECTION (June 1, 2011, 7:46 PM), http://nysbar.com/blogs/lawstudentconnection/2011/06/ 
erisa_history_purposes_and_pro.html. 
 52 Health Plans & Benefits, supra note 48. 
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disposition of its assets.”53 An ERISA fiduciary can also be any individual 
exercising “discretionary authority or discretionary responsibility in the 
administration of such plan.”54 
Since “[t]he text of ERISA does not give a relevant definition for what 
constitutes an ‘asset’ of an ERISA fund,” courts have had to develop the 
proper rule and are divided as to whether unpaid contributions can be plan 
assets.55 When unpaid contributions are classified as plan assets under ERISA, 
“officers of the nonpaying corporation with control and authority over the 
unpaid contributions may be held liable for the amount of nonpayment.”56 As 
this section will discuss, once the court recognizes unpaid contributions as plan 
assets, the individual in charge of contributing to the employee benefit funds is 
considered a “fiduciary” under ERISA and therefore held personally liable for 
the unpaid contributions. 
1. The Second Circuit 
In Bricklayers & Allied Craftworkers Local 2 v. Moulton Masonry & 
Construction, the Second Circuit held an individual personally liable as an 
ERISA fiduciary for unpaid contributions to the employee benefit plans.57 In 
that case, Moulton Masonry & Construction, LLC entered into a CBA with the 
Bricklayers and Allied Craftworkers Pension Fund.58 This agreement required 
the company to make contributions to the pension funds.59 Duane Moulton, the 
sole owner, officer, and shareholder of the company, signed the agreement, 
reported the employees’ working hours to the pension fund, and acted in 
connection with the auditor.60 A few years after the agreement’s execution, the 
pension fund requested a payroll audit pursuant to the terms of the agreement, 
but the company refused to cooperate, and the district court entered a default 
judgment against the company and Mr. Moulton.61 Eventually, the company 
complied with the requests from the pension fund’s auditor, and the auditor 
 
 53 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A)(i) (2012). 
 54 Id. § 1002(21)(A)(iii). An individual who “renders investment advice for a fee or other compensation, 
direct or indirect, with respect to any moneys or other property of such plan, or has any authority or 
responsibility to do so” is also a fiduciary for ERISA purposes. Id. 
 55 Hall, 334 F.3d at 1013. 
 56 Id. at 1012. 
 57 779 F.3d 182, 189 (2d Cir. 2015). 
 58 Id. at 184. 
 59 Id. 
 60 Id. at 185. 
 61 Id. 
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determined the company owed $451,300.52 in unpaid contributions to the 
pension funds.62 Shortly thereafter, the district court granted the pension fund’s 
motion for default judgment against the company and Mr. Moulton, holding 
each jointly and severally liable.63 The defendants appealed and argued, in 
relevant part, that questions of fact existed as to their liability for the unpaid 
contributions to the pension funds.64 
In determining whether the company was liable for the unpaid 
contributions, the court looked to the language of § 515 of ERISA, which 
states that “any employer who is obligated to make contributions to a 
multiemployer plan . . . under the terms of a collectively bargained agreement 
shall . . . make such contributions in accordance with the terms and conditions 
of . . . such agreement.”65 The court also noted that under ERISA, “if such an 
employer fails to make the required contributions, the court ‘shall award the 
plan’: ‘unpaid contributions,’ ‘interest,’ ‘liquidated damages provided for 
under the plan,’ ‘attorney’s fees and costs,’ and ‘such other legal or equitable 
relief the court deems appropriate.’”66 The court held the company was liable 
to the pension fund under ERISA because of the terms governing the 
agreement.67 
With respect to Mr. Moulton’s liability, however, the district court 
refrained from explicitly stating why it also found Mr. Moulton personally 
liable for the unpaid contributions.68 The court reasoned that “because no [] 
evidence suggested that the individual and corporate defendant are alter egos, 
Moulton could not have been found to be an ‘employer’ under Section 515 of 
ERISA.”69 Section 409 of ERISA, however, “provides an independent basis for 
Moulton’s liability in his individual capacity as a ‘fiduciary.’ A fiduciary, 
under ERISA is ‘someone who exercises any discretionary authority or 
discretionary control respecting management of [an ERISA benefit] plan or 
exercises any authority or control respecting management or disposition of its 
assets.’”70 When a fiduciary withholds plan assets, he becomes “personally 
 
 62 Id. 
 63 Id. 
 64 Id. at 185–86. 
 65 Id. at 187–88 (citing 29 U.S.C.§ 1145 (2012)). 
 66 Id. at 188 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(2)). 
 67 Id. 
 68 Id. 
 69 Id.; see 29 U.S.C. § 1145. 
 70 Moulton Masonry, 779 F.3d at 188 (quoting Finkel v. Romanowicz, 577 F.3d 79, 85 (2d Cir. 2009) 
(quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A)(i))). 
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liable to make good to such plan any losses to the plan.”71 While not all 
corporate officers and executives are fiduciaries under ERISA, those who 
“determin[e] which of the company’s creditors w[ill] be paid or in what 
order” are considered fiduciaries.72 
Mr. Moulton was the sole owner, officer, and shareholder of the company.73 
In this capacity, Mr. Moulton decided which creditors the company would pay, 
and he “exercised control over money due and owing” to the pension funds.74 
Thus, because Mr. Moulton both controlled the company’s finances and 
personally failed to make the monetary contributions owed to the pension 
funds, the court held that Mr. Moulton was indeed an ERISA fiduciary and 
thus liable to the pension fund for the unpaid contributions classified as plan 
assets under the agreement.75 
2. The Eleventh Circuit 
In ITPE Pension Fund v. Hall, the Eleventh Circuit, when confronted with 
a slightly different set of facts, determined that an individual could be held 
liable as a fiduciary for the unpaid contributions only when the governing 
agreement clearly stated that the unpaid contributions were plan assets.76 In 
that case, H&R Services entered into a CBA with a union.77 Under the 
agreement, the company promised to make contributions to the employee 
pension fund.78 Like the company in Bricklayers & Allied Craftworkers, the 
company in this case also failed to make the contributions.79 In response, the 
union filed suit against the company, and the district court granted summary 
judgment to the union.80 When the company failed to comply with the court’s 
order, the union sued Roger and Hope Hall directly, the company’s general 
manager and president, respectively.81 The issues on appeal were whether 
unpaid contributions can be classified as plan assets, and, if so, whether the 
 
 71 Id. (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a)). 
 72 Id. (quoting Finkel, 577 F.3d at 86). 
 73 Id. at 185. 
 74 Id. at 189. 
 75 Id. at 188–89. 
 76 334 F.3d 1011, 1014 (11th Cir. 2003). 
 77 Id. at 1012. 
 78 Id. 
 79 Id. 
 80 Id. 
 81 Id. 
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Halls were imputed fiduciary duties and therefore personally liable for the 
unpaid contributions.82 
In resolving whether the unpaid contributions were plan assets, the court 
noted that “unpaid employer contributions are not assets of a fund unless the 
agreement between the fund and the employer specifically and clearly declares 
otherwise.”83 The Halls argued that the unpaid employer contributions were not 
plan assets because the terms “Pension Fund” and “Fund” were defined in the 
agreement as “all property of every kind held or acquired under the provisions 
of [the] instrument.”84 The Halls therefore contended that the unpaid 
contributions were incapable of being “held” or “acquired” by the fund 
because they were unpaid.85 Unpersuaded, the court declined to limit the 
definition of “acquire” solely to physical possession of the contributions.86 
Since the plan contractually owns or controls the unpaid contributions by 
nature of the agreement, the court found that the unpaid contributions could 
fall within the scope of the term’s definition.87 In reaching this conclusion, the 
court relied on the dictionary definition of “acquire,” which means “to come 
into possession or ownership of . . .” and Black’s Law Dictionary definition of 
the term as “[t]o gain possession or control of . . . .”88 Since the agreement 
must specifically and clearly articulate that unpaid contributions were intended 
to be plan assets, however, the court continued its analysis of the agreement.89 
The “Establishment of Fund” section of the agreement stated, in relevant 
part,  
the [] Fund . . . shall be comprised of all monies received and held by 
the Trustees from employer contributions . . ., all income from 
investments made and held by the Trustees, . . . or any other property 
received and held or receivable by the Trustees for the uses and 
purposes set forth in th[e] agreement.90  
 
 82 Id. at 1012–13. 
 83 Id. at 1013. 
 84 Id. at 1014 (emphasis added). 
 85 Id. 
 86 Id. 
 87 Id. 
 88 Id. (quoting RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 18 (2d ed. 1987) (emphasis 
added); Acquire, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (7th ed. 1999) (emphasis added)). 
 89 Id. 
 90 Id. (emphasis added). 
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In this case, the argument turned on the last clause of that section.91  
After reviewing both parties’ arguments, the court determined that both 
interpretations had merit.92 Since an agreement must specifically and clearly 
articulate that unpaid contributions were intended to be classified as plan 
assets, the court stated that “a person should not be attributed fiduciary status 
under ERISA and held accountable for performance of the strict 
responsibilities required of him in that role, if he is not clearly aware of his 
status as a fiduciary.”93 Thus, while the court acknowledged that ERISA 
deserves broad construction, it was not willing to construe the statute so 
broadly that it would impute fiduciary duties to an individual without notice 
when he or she did not contract for such responsibility.94 The court remanded 
the case to the district court so the parties could engage in discovery and 
argument for purposes of determining contractual intent.95 With this opinion, 
the Eleventh Circuit effectively took the stance that parties get what they 
contract for—nothing more and nothing less. 
While courts generally do not consider unpaid contributions by employers 
to be plan assets,96 many plan documents define plan assets to include all 
required contributions—even ones set to be made at a future date.97 For this 
reason, both the Second and Eleventh Circuits found that when an agreement 
specifically defines an employee benefit fund to include future unpaid 
contributions by employers, then the unpaid contributions are plan assets.98 
Further, in such circumstances, individuals who possess authority and control 
 
 91 Id. 
 92 Id. at 1015. The union argued that because receivable property is property of the fund, and unpaid 
contributions are receivable, the unpaid contributions are clearly plan assets. Id. at 1014. However, Mr. and 
Mrs. Hall argued that the unpaid contributions were not plan assets because they were not “received and held” 
by the trustees. Id. at 1015. According to the Halls, the provision that “any other property received or held or 
receivable by the Trustees” did not apply to “employer contributions” because the agreement addressed the 
“asset-status” of employer contributions in a separate category preceding that provision. Id. In response, the 
union argued that “any other property received or held or receivable by the Trustees” was a “catch-all 
provision” that covered “all other property” not otherwise classified as an asset under the agreement—i.e., 
unpaid employer contributions. Id. 
 93 Id.  
 94 Id. 
 95 Id. at 1016. 
 96 See Cline v. Indus. Maint. Eng’g & Contracting Co., 200 F.3d 1233, 1234 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 97 James McElligott Jr. & Robert Wynne, Ninth Circuit: Multiemployer Plan Calling Unpaid 
Contributions “Plan Assets” Does Not Make Persons Controlling Contribution Payments ERISA Fiduciaries, 
JD SUPRA BUSINESS ADVISOR (Aug. 13, 2015), www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/ninth-circuit-multiemployer-
plan-44468/. 
 98 See Bricklayers & Allied Craftworkers Local 2 v. Moulton Masonry & Constr., LLC, 779 F.3d 182, 
184 (2d Cir. 2015); Hall, 334 F.3d at 1012. 
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over the plan assets are imputed fiduciary duties under ERISA and held 
personally liable for the unpaid contributions.99 
B. ERISA’s Application in Bankruptcy Proceedings  
When the circuit courts have decided these issues within the bankruptcy 
context, however, they have completely abandoned the aforementioned 
reasoning and further muddled the law surrounding ERISA.100 If unpaid 
contributions are classified as plan assets, and an individual exercising 
authority or control over those assets is imputed fiduciary status under ERISA, 
those unpaid contributions could be considered a nondischargeable debt in 
bankruptcy.101 For the reasons discussed below, however, courts have refrained 
to give “fiduciary” a consistent meaning under both ERISA and the Code. 
While the Code does not specifically define “fiduciary,” some courts have 
held that “if an individual is a fiduciary for purposes of ERISA, [then] the 
individual is also treated as a fiduciary for purposes of § 523(a)(4).”102 Other 
courts, however, take a more limited approach in recognizing fiduciary status 
within the bankruptcy context because of their apprehension surrounding the 
notion of unpaid contributions as nondischargeable debts for individual 
debtors.103 As this section will show, three circuit courts have either improperly 
declined to classify unpaid contributions as plan assets or refrained from 
imposing ERISA fiduciary status to the individual in an attempt to protect the 
debtor.104 
1. The Sixth Circuit 
In Board of Trustees v. Bucci (In re Bucci), the Sixth Circuit determined 
this issue within the context of a bankruptcy proceeding.105 Charles Bucci, 
president and sole shareholder of Floors by Bucci, signed a CBA on behalf of 
his company, requiring it to make monthly contributions to the employees’ 
pension fund.106 After failing to make the required contributions for more than 
 
 99 See Moulton Masonry, 779 F.3d at 184; Hall, 334 F.3d at 1012. 
 100 See, e.g., Bos v. Bd. of Trs., 795 F.3d 1006, 1007 (9th Cir. 2015); In re Bucci, 493 F.3d 635, 637 (6th 
Cir. 2007); In re Luna, 406 F.3d 1192, 1197 (10th Cir. 2005). 
 101 See McElligot & Wynne, supra note 97.  
 102 Bos, 795 F.3d at 1008 (citing Blyler v. Hemmeter (In re Hemmeter), 242 F.3d 1186, 1190 (9th Cir. 
2001)). 
 103 Id. at 1011. 
 104 See, e.g., Bos, 795 F.3d at 1007; In re Bucci, 493 F.3d at 637; In re Luna, 406 F.3d at 1197.  
 105 493 F.3d at 637. 
 106 Id. at 637–38. 
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a year, Mr. Bucci filed a chapter 7 bankruptcy petition in his individual 
capacity and listed in his schedules a $99,000 debt to the pension fund for 
unpaid contributions.107 In response, the trustee, on behalf of the fund, filed an 
adversary proceeding in the bankruptcy court seeking a declaration that the 
unpaid contributions should not be discharged.108 
Mr. Bucci was the only officer and director of his company; made all 
corporate decisions; and did not separate his corporate and personal finances.109 
Thus, the plan trustee argued Mr. Bucci was the alter ego of his company and, 
as such, his failure to make the required contributions was a “defalcation while 
acting in a fiduciary capacity” under § 523(a)(4) of the Code.110 Even though 
Mr. Bucci conceded that he was the alter ego of his company, the court stated 
that a “defalcation is limited to situations where the parties to a creditor-debtor 
relationship intend for the debtor to act as a trustee of the monies owed.”111 
The bankruptcy court held that § 523(a)(4) did not apply because Mr. Bucci 
was not a fiduciary of the unpaid contributions.112 While it was undisputed that 
Mr. Bucci was contractually obligated to make the contributions, the evidence 
did not show that Mr. Bucci acted as a trustee.113 The district court affirmed the 
bankruptcy court’s decision, determining ERISA did not apply under the 
premise that “being a fiduciary under ERISA’s broad definition of that term is 
not enough” to impute fiduciary status to an individual in a bankruptcy 
proceeding.114  
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit had to consider whether the unpaid 
contributions were a nondischargeable debt under § 523(a)(4) since Mr. Bucci 
had previously conceded to being the alter ego of his company and therefore 
potentially liable for the unpaid contributions.115 The court defined 
 
 107 Id. 
 108 Id. at 637. 
 109 Id. at 638. 
 110 Id. at 637; see also 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4) (2012). 
 111 In re Bucci, 493 F.3d at 638. The Sixth Circuit noted the bankruptcy court’s reliance on Sixth Circuit 
precedent that limited § 523(a)(4) “to only those situations involving an express or technical trust relationship 
arising from placement of a specific res in the hands of the debtor.” In re Bucci, No. 05-10195, 2006 WL 
4458363, at *4 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio Mar. 24, 2006) (quoting Commonwealth Land Title Co. v. Blaszak (In re 
Blaszak), 397 F.3d 386, 391 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting R.E. Am., Inc. v. Garver (In re Garver), 116 F.3d 176, 
180 (6th Cir. 1997))), aff’d sub nom. Bd. of Trs. of Ohio Carpenters’ Pension Fund v. Bucci, 351 B.R. 876 
(N.D. Ohio 2006), aff’d sub nom. In re Bucci, 493 F.3d 635 (6th Cir. 2007). 
 112 Id. at 637. 
 113 Id. at 638. 
 114 Id. at 639. 
 115 Id. 
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“defalcation” as “encompass[ing] not only embezzlement and misappropriation 
by a fiduciary, but also the ‘failure to properly account for such funds.’”116 A 
debt is nondischargeable as a defalcation when the evidence shows: “(1) a 
preexisting fiduciary relationship; (2) breach of that fiduciary relationship; and 
(3) a resulting loss.”117 The court stated that it “construes the term ‘fiduciary 
capacity’ found in the defalcation provision of § 523(a)(4) more narrowly than 
the term is used in other circumstances.”118  
Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Davis v. Aetna Acceptance Co., 
in which the Court determined that an individual may be a fiduciary if he or 
she was a trustee before the “act of wrongdoing,”119 the Sixth Circuit noted that 
the defalcation provision applies only to “those situations involving an express 
or technical trust relationship arising from placement of a specific res in the 
hands of the debtor.”120 To show that an express or technical trust relationship 
exists, a creditor must demonstrate: “(1) an intent to create a trust; (2) a trustee; 
(3) a trust res;121 and (4) a definite beneficiary.”122 The court also noted that it is 
possible for a statute to create a trust for purposes of § 523(a)(4) if it “defines 
the trust res, imposes duties on the trustee, and those duties exist prior to any 
act of wrongdoing.”123 
Implementing this analysis, the plan trustee argued that ERISA created an 
express trust because the employer contributions, classified as plan assets 
under ERISA, created the necessary trust res.124 Further, Mr. Bucci was an 
ERISA trustee because “he exercised control over the assets by choosing to not 
pay the contributions.”125 Lastly, ERISA imposed managerial duties on Mr. 
Bucci because it required him to hold the plan assets for his employees’ 
benefit.126 
 
 116 Id. (quoting Capitol Indemnity Corp. v. Interstate Agency, Inc. (In re Interstate Agency), 760 F.2d 
121, 125 (6th Cir. 1985)). 
 117 Id. (quoting In re Blaszak, 397 F.3d 386, 390 (6th Cir. 2005)). 
 118 Id. (quoting In re Blaszak, 397 F.3d at 391). 
 119 293 U.S. 328, 333 (1934). 
 120 In re Bucci, 493 F.3d at 639–40 (quoting In re Garver, 116 F.3d 176, 178 (6th Cir. 1997)); see Davis, 
293 U.S. at 333. 
 121 Res, commonly referred to as corpus, is “[t]he property for which a trustee is responsible; the trust 
principal.” Corpus, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 122 In re Bucci, 493 F.3d at 640 (quoting In re Blaszak, 397 F.3d at 391–92). 
 123 Id.  
 124 Id.  
 125 Id.; see also Moore v. LaFayette Life Ins. Co., 458 F.3d 416, 438 (6th Cir. 2006) (defining an ERISA 
fiduciary as an individual “who exercises discretionary control or authority over a plan’s management, 
administration, or assets”). 
 126 In re Bucci, 493 F.3d at 640. 
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In assessing this argument, the court made two important determinations. 
First, the court noted that neither of the lower courts addressed whether the 
employer contributions were indeed plan assets under ERISA.127 Following the 
logic of the Eleventh Circuit, however, the court assumed the employer 
contributions were plan assets because Mr. Bucci and the pension fund’s 
agreement specifically provided that “contributions due to be received are 
assets belonging to the fund.”128  
Second, the court pointed out that the plan trustee did not argue the 
agreement itself made Mr. Bucci a trustee, but rather Mr. Bucci was an ERISA 
fiduciary because he exercised authority and control over the plan assets when 
he actively chose not to pay the contributions.129 The court found this reasoning 
to be flawed and problematic because for a trust relationship to satisfy 
§ 523(a)(4), the fiduciary “must have duties that preexist the act creating the 
debt.”130 Mr. Bucci’s breach of his contractual obligation to make the employer 
contributions was simultaneously the act that created the debt and the exercise 
of control; therefore, Mr. Bucci was an ERISA fiduciary.131 Thus, the trust 
relationship “spr[ung] from the act from which the debt arose,” and it therefore 
failed to create an express or technical trust for purposes of § 523(a)(4).132 
The court declined to extend ERISA’s broad interpretation of fiduciary to 
the defalcation provision.133 In bankruptcy proceedings, the court emphasized 
that individual debtors have “only a contractual obligation to pay the employer 
contributions,” which is not enough to trigger the fiduciary component of the 
defalcation provision.134 Thus, the unpaid contributions were a dischargeable 
debt in Mr. Bucci’s bankruptcy proceeding. 
 
 127 Id. at 642. 
 128 Id.; see ITPE Pension Fund v. Hall, 334 F.3d 1011, 1013 (11th Cir. 2003) (“Traditionally, the proper 
rule, developed by caselaw, is that unpaid employer contributions are not assets of a fund unless the agreement 
between the fund and the employer specifically and clearly declares otherwise.”). 
 129 In re Bucci, 493 F.3d at 643. 
 130 Id.; see Davis v. Aetna Acceptance Co., 293 U.S. 328, 333 (1934); Carlisle Cashway, Inc. v. Johnson 
(In re Johnson), 691 F.2d 249, 252 (6th Cir. 1982). 
 131 In re Bucci, 493 F.3d at 643. 
 132 Id.  
 133 Id. But see In re Hemmeter, 242 F.3d 1186, 1190 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that “ERISA satisfies the 
traditional requirements for a statutory fiduciary to qualify as a fiduciary under § 523(a)(4)”). 
 134 In re Bucci, 493 F.3d at 643. 
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2. The Tenth Circuit 
In Navarre v. Luna (In re Luna), the Tenth Circuit also addressed this issue 
within the context of a bankruptcy proceeding.135 In In re Luna, the Tenth 
Circuit determined that the unpaid contributions were a dischargeable debt in 
the debtor’s bankruptcy.136 Joyce and Mark Luna each owned 50% of Luna 
Steel Erectors. Ms. Luna was the company’s president, secretary, and record-
keeper, and Mr. Luna was the company’s vice president.137 Ms. Luna, acting as 
owner of the company, entered into a CBA with a local union, which obligated 
the company to make monthly contributions to the pension funds.138 As with 
the other cases, the financial state of the company weakened, and the Lunas 
failed to make the required contributions.139 
In an effort to keep the company afloat, Ms. Luna withdrew $43,000 from 
her IRA and $7,000 in savings bonds and deposited it into the company bank 
account.140 Further, Mr. Luna took out a personal loan for $30,000 and lent it to 
the company.141 These cash advances proved to be futile, and the company was 
unable to reimburse the Lunas.142 Out of options, the Lunas agreed to dissolve 
the company.143 Their growing financial obligations forced each of them to file 
chapter 7 bankruptcy petitions in their individual capacities.144 At the time of 
their filing dates, more than $120,000 was owed to the pension funds.145 In 
response, the plan trustee filed suit in the United States Bankruptcy Court 
seeking a declaration that the Lunas be held personally liable for the unpaid 
contributions, and that the debt be classified as nondischargeable under 
§ 523(a)(4).146 Since the Lunas exclusively managed the plan assets, they 
exercised the necessary authority and control required to subject them to 
fiduciary status under ERISA.147 The plan trustee asserted this classification 
 
 135 406 F.3d 1192, 1197 (10th Cir. 2005). 
 136 Id. at 1199. 
 137 Id. at 1197. 
 138 Id.  
 139 Id.  
 140 Id.  
 141 Id.  
 142 Id.  
 143 Id.  
 144 Id.  
 145 Id.  
 146 Id.  
 147 Id. at 1198; see 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A) (2012). 
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was enough for the Lunas also to be treated as fiduciaries under the defalcation 
provision.148 
The bankruptcy court disagreed, finding the unpaid contributions were not 
plan assets. The court found the plan trustee’s argument to be incomplete 
because “while ERISA imposes fiduciary obligations under § 523(a)(4) of the 
Code, [] unpaid contributions do not constitute plan assets.”149 Since unpaid 
contributions must be classified as plan assets to trigger ERISA fiduciary status 
in this context, the court held that the Lunas had not engaged in defalcation, 
and the debt should be discharged in bankruptcy.150 The plan trustee appealed, 
and the district court affirmed the decision of the bankruptcy court.151  
After the district court affirmed the bankruptcy court’s decision,152 the 
Tenth Circuit addressed two issues: (1) whether unpaid plan contributions were 
plan assets; and (2) whether the Lunas were fiduciaries.153 First, the plan trustee 
argued that “unpaid contributions become plan assets at the time they become 
due and owing.”154 The Lunas, however, asserted that their obligation to make 
contributions was purely contractual because “contributions owed to the 
Pension Fund did not become plan assets until they [were] paid to it.”155  
Since ERISA does not define what establishes an “asset” of an ERISA 
fund, the court began its analysis by looking at the plain meaning of the term 
“asset.”156 The court turned to Black’s Law Dictionary, which defines “Asset” 
as “(1) an item that is owned and has value; (2) the entries on a balance sheet 
showing the items of property owned, including cash, inventory, equipment, 
real estate, accounts receivable, and good will; (3) all the property of a person 
available for paying debts.”157 The court interpreted the definition to mean “the 
person or entity holding the asset has an ownership interest in a given thing, 
 
 148 In re Luna, 406 F.3d at 1198. 
 149 Id. The plan trustee argued that the Lunas had engaged in “fraud or defalcation” while acting in a 
fiduciary capacity because they generated some income and incurred personal expenses during the time period 
that they failed to make the required contributions to the pension funds. Id. at 1197. 
 150 Id. at 1198. 
 151 Id. 
 152 Id. (finding that “unpaid contributions do not become plan assets until they have been paid into 
particular funds”). 
 153 Id.  
 154 Id.  
 155 Id.  
 156 Id. at 1199. 
 157 Id. (quoting Asset, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 112 (7th ed. 1999)). 
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whether tangible or intangible.”158 To determine ownership interest, the court 
next looked to the common law of property.159 
While an ERISA plan does not have a “present interest” in the unpaid 
contributions until they are actually paid and received by the plan, it does hold 
a “future interest” in the “collection of the contractually-owed 
contributions.”160 The court held the district court erred in finding that the 
unpaid contributions were not plan assets under ERISA.161 While its method 
departed from the Eleventh Circuit’s “contractual language approach,” the 
court recognized that “in some cases reference to the plan documents will aid 
in the determination of what constitutes a plan asset.”162 In this case, the 
language in the agreement concerning whether unpaid contributions were plan 
assets was unclear.163 With this reasoning, the court created a novel 
interpretation of plan assets by recognizing them as the “contractual right to 
collect the unpaid contributions” instead of the unpaid contributions 
themselves.164 
Next, the court determined that the Lunas were not ERISA fiduciaries. In 
reaching this conclusion, the court had to consider whether the Lunas 
“exercise[d] any authority or control respecting management or disposition of 
[plan] assets.”165 The court made two important findings in this assessment. 
First, the court stated: “The act of failing to make contributions to the funds 
cannot reasonably be construed as taking part in ‘management’ or ‘disposition’ 
of a plan asset.”166 Since the court recognized the plan asset to be the 
contractual right to collect the unpaid contributions, not the unpaid 
contributions themselves, “[i]t is the Trustees, not the Lunas, who control the 
contractual right to collect unpaid contributions from the Lunas.”167 
 
 158 Id.  
 159 Id.; see U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Office of Pension & Welfare Benefit Programs (ERISA), Advisory 
Opinion No. 93-14A (May 5, 1993) (“The assets of a plan generally are to be identified on the basis of 
ordinary notions of property rights under non-ERISA law. In general, the assets of a welfare plan would 
include any property, tangible or intangible, in which the plan has a beneficial ownership interest.”). 
 160 In re Luna, 406 F.3d at 1199. 
 161 Id. at 1200. 
 162 Id. at 1200–01. 
 163 Id. at 1201. 
 164 Id. at 1204 (explaining that “even if the [plan] asset were the unpaid contributions themselves, it is still 
not clear that the statutory definition [of an ERISA fiduciary] would be met . . . there were never any 
earmarked funds or segregated account for the contributions.”). 
 165 Id. at 1201; see 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A)(i) (2012). 
 166 In re Luna, 406 F.3d at 1204. 
 167 Id. at 1206. 
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Second, the court determined that the Lunas’ sole discretionary choice to 
not make the required contributions was insufficient to impose fiduciary 
status.168 The Lunas “exercised no control over how the Trustees manage[d] or 
dispose[d] of that asset;”169 their only duty under the agreement was to make 
the monthly contributions.170 The Lunas’ decision to use what money they had 
to pay other business expenses instead of contributing to the pension funds 
“was a business decision [and] not a breach of fiduciary duty.”171 The court 
therefore held that the Lunas were “merely debtors” and not ERISA 
fiduciaries.172 Thus, the unpaid contributions were a dischargeable debt in 
bankruptcy.173 
3. The Ninth Circuit 
The Ninth Circuit is the most recent circuit to address the issue, and the 
court opted to follow the approaches of the Sixth and Tenth Circuits. In Bos v. 
Board of Trustees, Gregory Bos was the president and owner of Bos 
Enterprises.174 Mr. Bos, on behalf of the company, entered into the Carpenters’ 
Master Agreement, which required the company to contribute monthly 
payments to the pension funds.175 Soon afterward, Mr. Bos struggled 
financially and failed to make the required contributions.176 Mr. Bos signed a 
promissory note personally guaranteeing the unpaid contributions, totaling 
$359,592.09.177 After Mr. Bos failed to make payments on the note, the board 
of trustees filed a grievance against Mr. Bos and the company to recover the 
unpaid contributions, and an arbitrator awarded the board $504,282.59.178 Mr. 
Bos and his spouse then filed a joint chapter 7 petition, and the board filed a 
complaint against Mr. Bos contesting the dischargeability of the $504,282.59 
in unpaid contributions under § 523(a)(4).179 
 
 168 Id. at 1208. 
 169 Id. at 1204. 
 170 Id. at 1206. 
 171 Id. at 1207–08 (emphasizing that the Lunas were trying to keep their company afloat in the face of 
depleting finances and were forced to prioritize which financial obligations were most important). 
 172 Id. at 1204–05. 
 173 Id. at 1208. 
 174 795 F.3d 1006, 1007 (9th Cir. 2015).  
 175 Id.  
 176 Id. at 1008. 
 177 Id.  
 178 Id. While Mr. Bos did make one payment for $30,824.99 after signing the note, the remaining 
outstanding balance went unpaid. Id. 
 179 Id.  
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Mr. Bos personally controlled the money that was contractually required to 
be paid to the pension funds under both the agreement and the promissory 
note.180 Since the agreement “defined the funds as including contributions 
‘required . . . to be made’ to the funds,” the bankruptcy court concluded that 
the unpaid contributions were plan assets.181 Thus, the court held that Mr. Bos 
“had committed defalcation while acting as a fiduciary of the funds and [] the 
$504,282.59 debt to the funds was therefore nondischargeable.”182 The district 
court subsequently affirmed the decision of the bankruptcy court on the same 
grounds.183 Mr. Bos appealed and argued that he was not a fiduciary under the 
defalcation provision.184 
The Ninth Circuit, following the reasoning of the Sixth Circuit, stated, “For 
a debt to be held nondischargeable under § 523(a)(4)’s defalcation provision, 
the debtor must have been a fiduciary prior to his commission of the fraud or 
defalcation.”185 The act that created the debt therefore cannot be the same act 
creating the fiduciary relationship.186 Further, in this circuit, “[i]f an individual 
is a fiduciary for purposes of [ERISA], the individual is also treated as a 
fiduciary for purposes of § 523(a)(4).”187 
The court also determined that the unpaid contributions were not plan 
assets,188 ignoring the decisions of its district courts and adopting the reasoning 
from the Sixth and Tenth Circuits.189  
 
 180 Id. at 1009. 
 181 Id.  
 182 Id. at 1008. 
 183 Id.  
 184 Id.  
 185 Id.  
 186 Id.  
 187 Id.; see In re Hemmeter, 242 F.3d 1186, 1190 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 188 The Ninth Circuit has “consistently held that unpaid contributions by employers to employee benefit 
funds are not plan assets.” Bos, 795 F.3d at 1009; see Cline v. Indus. Maint. Eng’g & Contracting Co., 200 
F.3d 1223, 1234 (9th Cir. 2000). However, several district courts within the Ninth Circuit have deviated from 
the precedent set in Cline when “the plan document expressly defines the fund to include future payments.” 
Bos, 795 F.3d at 1009; see Bd. of Trs. v. River View Constr., No. C-12-03514 PJH DMR, 2013 WL 2147418, 
at *6, 18 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (concluding that “when the plan document defined the fund as including ‘all 
contributions required . . . to be made,’ unpaid contributions were plan assets”); Trs. of the S. Cal. Pipe Trades 
Health & Welfare Tr. Fund v. Temecula Mech., Inc., 438 F. Supp. 2d 1156, 1165 (C.D. Cal. 2006) (concluding 
that “when the plan document defined the fund as including money ‘due and owing to the fund by the 
employers,’ unpaid contributions were plan assets”). Under these circumstances, the courts have imputed 
ERISA fiduciary status to employers based upon their “control over unpaid contributions to the fund[s].” Bos, 
795 F.3d at 1009. 
 189 Bos, 795 F.3d at 1011–12. 
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In an attempt to avoid the problem of the same act creating both the 
wrongdoing and the fiduciary status, the board argued that “[the plan] asset 
could be classified as amounts which the employer must eventually contribute 
to the plan, but which are not yet due.”190 The court rejected this argument, 
however, because “until the time payment is due, the plan does not actually 
possess the money, and in fact has no present right to it.”191 The plan asset is 
more appropriately classified as “the contractual right to bring a claim against 
the employer for delinquent payments if the payments are in fact never 
made.”192 
The court further noted that even if the language in the agreement and the 
promissory note dictated that unpaid contributions be classified as plan assets, 
the defalcation provision would remain inapplicable because Mr. Bos lacked 
control over the plan assets prior to his default.193 Since neither the company 
nor Mr. Bos ever exercised control over the plan assets, the court held that “the 
unpaid contributions to employee benefit funds are not plan assets [and] [Mr.] 
Bos did not engage in defalcation for purposes of § 523(a)(4).”194 Thus, the 
unpaid contributions were a dischargeable debt in bankruptcy.195 
The key issue here that courts seem to be misunderstanding is that the 
extension of the reasoning purported by both the Second and Eleventh Circuits 
does not necessarily mean that every fiduciary debtor who finds himself or 
herself in such an unfortunate situation will be slammed with nondischargeable 
debt.196 One of the fundamental goals of the bankruptcy system is “[to give] the 
honest but unfortunate debtor . . . a new opportunity in life and a clear field for 
future effort, unhampered by the pressure and discouragement of preexisting 
debt.”197 The fresh start is an important social policy; however, courts should 
not construe it so broadly that we throw away our ability to hold dishonest 
debtors accountable for their misdeeds against others. 
 
 190 Id. at 1011. 
 191 Id. 
 192 Id. 
 193 Id. at 1012. 
 194 Id. 
 195 Id. 
 196 See Chao v. Duncan (In re Duncan), 331 B.R. 70, 82 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2005) (“[Not] every debt 
arising from or related to an ERISA violation by an ERISA fiduciary will be excepted from discharge by 
Section 523(a)(4).”). 
 197 Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934). 
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II. ANALYSIS 
Courts should adopt a three-step approach to determine whether an 
employer’s unpaid contributions to employee benefit funds are dischargeable 
in bankruptcy. First, courts should treat CBAs like other contractual 
agreements and enforce provisions that designate employer contributions as 
plan assets. This Comment will demonstrate that while a collectively bargained 
agreement for a multiemployer pension plan is different from a typical 
contractual agreement, the normal rules and guidelines of contract law still 
apply. Where the provisions of a contract are unclear, courts try to determine, 
and enforce, the intent of the parties. Courts should apply the same principles 
of contract interpretation in these scenarios and find that where a CBA clearly 
designates employer contributions as plan assets, parties to the agreement 
intended for that provision to be fully upheld. 
Second, in a bankruptcy proceeding, courts should presume the term 
“fiduciary” is consistent in both ERISA and the Code. Third, courts should 
adopt the Supreme Court’s narrow reading of the defalcation provision. This 
Comment will demonstrate that this narrow reading provides an avenue of 
relief for employees who have been wronged by dishonest debtors while 
simultaneously preserving an honest debtor’s fresh start in bankruptcy.  
This three-step approach will bring clarity to an already muddled and 
complex area of the law and ensure that dishonest debtors are held accountable 
under § 523(a)(4) for their willful and conscious disregard of the fiduciary 
duties owed to dependent employees. 
A. Courts Should Defer to the Intent of the Parties 
1. Collective Bargaining Agreements Are “Super Contracts” 
When a CBA specifically defines that all employer contributions are plan 
assets, courts should preserve contractual intent. The Supreme Court has stated 
that “a collective bargaining agreement is not an ordinary contract.”198 In fact, 
“the collective agreement may have more ‘contractualness’ than many other 
bargained transactions.”199 The collective agreement is not a standard contract 
used purely to sell a commodity or ensure the repayment of a loan.200 Instead, 
 
 198 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 550 (1964). 
 199 Clyde W. Summers, Collective Agreements and the Law of Contracts, 78 YALE L.J. 525, 534 (1969). 
 200 See id. 
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one multiemployer agreement often binds hundreds of employers and their 
employees while simultaneously guiding the parties through an ongoing 
employment relationship and covering many facets of their particularized 
industry.201 Thus, “the collective agreement is pre-eminently an instrument of 
private planning, and its qualities of complexity and continuity reflect the 
importance of its planning function.”202 In fact, “[w]hen measured against the 
complexity of the relationship they govern, collective agreements provide 
more detailed planning and make more complete provision for contingencies, 
both foreseen and unforeseen, than many of the commercial contracts . . . .”203 
In other words, CBAs are “super contracts” because of their complexity 
and the number of people they affect. When problems arise under a CBA, the 
ramifications are huge because of the number of people affected.204 The 
employer and the individuals representing the employees must carefully 
negotiate and plan the terms that will govern for many years to come—
potentially even decades.205  
Despite the parties’ best efforts to be meticulous, however, the resulting 
CBA “cannot possibly provide for the myriad of variant situations which might 
arise” because of “the diverse congeries of matters” that the agreement 
covers.206 Since CBAs contemplate nearly every aspect of the employment 
relationship,207 a faulty or ambiguous provision does not lead to an end of the 
agreement or relationship. The parties must remedy the problem so the show 
can go on. 
Because of the nature of CBAs, if an agreement clearly states that plan 
assets include unpaid contributions, then the language in the agreement should 
govern. In an atmosphere filled with “pressures to reach a settlement,” courts 
should take the unambiguous language of a CBA at face value so the parties 
can better focus on the inevitable gaps and ambiguities that may give rise to 
extensive litigation.208 The majority of litigation surrounding CBAs arises 
because “the officers of the union, or management, or both, are unwilling to 
 
 201 See id. at 528. 
 202 Id. at 534. 
 203 Id. at 535. 
 204 See id. at 529. 
 205 See id. at 530. 
 206 Id. at 529. 
 207 Id. at 528. 
 208 See id. at 529. 
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accept responsibility for agreeing to an inescapable result.”209 But, “[i]t is not 
the province of the court to rewrite an agreement to rectify an ambiguity, to 
avoid hardship to a party, or because one party has become dissatisfied with its 
terms.”210 When courts interpret CBAs, “the traditional rules of contract 
interpretation apply as long as they are consistent with federal labor 
policies.”211 Since “[t]he text of ERISA does not give a relevant definition for 
what constitutes an ‘asset’ of an ERISA fund,” the natural next step, therefore, 
is for the courts to defer to the intent of the parties.212 
2. Unpaid Contributions Are Plan Assets when Accompanied with Clear 
Language 
Despite the general rule that unpaid contributions are not plan assets,213 we 
have seen that five circuits214 have either classified unpaid contributions as plan 
assets or hypothesized the possibility that unpaid contributions could be plan 
assets under certain circumstances. The hesitation of full recognition arises 
when a bankruptcy proceeding accompanies the issues at hand.215 This 
hesitation is unwarranted, however, since courts can evaluate each issue 
individually before deciding whether to hold a debtor liable for defalcation.  
Because the first step in a bankruptcy case involving a debtor’s unpaid 
contributions is to determine whether the delinquent contributions are plan 
assets, courts should adopt the reasoning of the Second and Eleventh Circuits 
and simply look to the governing agreement for clear, specific language that 
classifies unpaid employer contributions as plan assets.216 This determination is 
important because ERISA provides fiduciary responsibilities for those 
managing and controlling plan assets.217 If the language is present, then the 
 
 209 Id. at 536. 
 210 Young v. Anne Arundel Cty., 146 Md. App. 526, 587 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1992). 
 211 Aeronautical Indus. Dist. Lodge 91 v. United Tech. Corp., 230 F.3d 569, 576 (2d Cir. 2000). 
 212 See ITPE Pension Fund v. Hall, 334 F.3d 1011, 1013 (11th Cir. 2003). 
 213 See Cline v. Indus. Maint. Eng’g & Contracting Co., 200 F.3d 1233, 1234 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 214 See Bos v. Bd. of Trs., 795 F.3d 1006, 1007 (9th Cir. 2015); Bricklayers & Allied Craftworkers Local 
2 v. Moulton Masonry & Constr., LLC, 779 F.3d 182, 184 (2d Cir. 2015); In re Bucci, 493 F.3d 635, 637 (6th 
Cir. 2007); In re Luna, 406 F.3d 1192, 1197 (10th Cir. 2005); Hall, 334 F.3d at 1012. 
 215 See Bos, 795 F.3d at 1007. 
 216 See, e.g., Hall, 334 F.3d at 1012; Trs. of Constr. Indus. v. Archie, No. 2:12–CV–225 JCM (VCF), 
2014 WL 846498, at *4 (D. Nev. 2014) (holding that unpaid contributions were plan assets based upon the 
language in the agreement); Galgay v. Gangloff, 677 F. Supp. 295, 301 (M.D. Penn. 1987) (declaring that the 
“clear and undisputed language [of the agreement] stating [] title to all monies ‘due and owing’ the plaintiff 
fund is ‘vested’ in the fund,” thereby classifying “any delinquent employer contributions vested assets of the 
plaintiff fund”). 
 217 Health Plans & Benefits, supra note 48. 
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unpaid contributions are plan assets. If the language is not present, then the 
default rule218 prevails; the unpaid contributions are not plan assets; and the 
inquiry ends.  
With this approach in mind, “[t]rustees seeking to maximize the trust 
fund’s ability to collect employer contributions should explicitly define in the 
plan documents and agreements with employers that plan assets include all 
unpaid employer contributions in the hands of the employer.”219 While the 
recognition of unpaid contributions as plan assets places “heavy 
responsibilities on employers,” it only does so “to the extent that . . . an 
employer freely accept[ed] those responsibilities in collective bargaining.”220 
Indeed, many plan documents define plan assets to include all required 
contributions. A court’s progression to step two infra is therefore highly 
likely.221 
This approach would produce two benefits. First, not only does this 
approach provide clarification for courts by offering a hard line rule for 
determining whether unpaid contributions are plan assets, but it also spares 
employees and employers from having to dedicate time, energy, and resources 
to litigation over unambiguous contract language. Second, this method is 
consistent with the traditional rules of contract interpretation, which require 
courts to give deference to the unambiguous language of an agreement.222 It is 
clear, then, that courts should adopt a different approach when determining the 
dischargeability of a debtor’s unpaid contributions, but this step is just the first 
in this inquiry. 
 
 218 See EMPLOYEE BENEFITS SEC. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, FIELD ASSISTANCE BULLETIN 2008-1 1 
(Feb. 1, 2008) (“Employer contributions become an asset of the plan only when the contribution has been 
made.”). 
 219 Neal S. Schelberg & Aaron J. Feuer, Fiduciary Liability for Unpaid Employer Contributions, 51 
BENEFITS MAG., Aug. 2014, at 42, 45, http://www.ifebp.org/inforequest/ifebp/0165697.pdf.  
 220 Hall, 334 F.3d at 1014 (citing NYSA-ILA Med. & Clinical Servs. Fund ex rel. Capo v. Catucci, 60 F. 
Supp. 2d 194, 201 (S.D.N.Y. 1999)). 
 221 See McElligott Jr. & Wynne, supra note 97.  
 222 See M & G Polymers USA, LLC v. Tackett, 135 S. Ct. 926, 929 (2015); see also WILLISTON ON 
CONTRACTS, § 30:6 (4th ed. 2009) (“When a collective-bargaining agreement is unambiguous, its meaning 
must be ascertained in accordance with its plainly expressed intent.”). 
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B. Presumption of Consistent Usage of “Fiduciary” Under ERISA and the 
Code 
Second, courts should presume the term “fiduciary” is consistent in both 
ERISA and the Code in a bankruptcy proceeding.223 This section proceeds in 
three parts. First, it will examine what it means to be an ERISA fiduciary and 
explain how the circuit courts have applied the guiding language of ERISA in 
nonbankruptcy proceedings. Second, it will discuss what it means to be a 
fiduciary under the Code and assess how the circuit courts have refrained from 
imputing ERISA fiduciary status to debtors in bankruptcy proceedings. Third, 
it will argue that courts should presume that “fiduciary” has a consistent 
meaning under both ERISA and the Code. 
1. ERISA: Construing “Fiduciary” Broadly 
After determining that unpaid contributions are plan assets, courts should 
next assess whether the individual is an ERISA fiduciary. Each employee 
benefit fund must appoint “one or more named fiduciaries who jointly or 
severally shall have authority to control and manage the operation and 
administration of the plan.”224 Aside from these designated fiduciaries, 
“individuals may acquire fiduciary status if they exercise the fiduciary 
functions set forth [under ERISA].”225 Recall that ERISA defines a “fiduciary” 
as an individual who “exercises any discretionary authority or discretionary 
control respecting management of such plan or exercises any authority or 
control respecting management or disposition of its asset.”226  
Further, an ERISA fiduciary can also be any individual exercising 
“discretionary authority or discretionary responsibility in the administration of 
such plan.”227 The common activities of ERISA fiduciaries include “providing 
 
 223 While this section ultimately argues for a presumption of consistent usage for the term “fiduciary,” the 
best way for parties to avoid this part of the analysis in court is to obligate the individuals who will be making 
the employer contributions to take on fiduciary duties within the contract. If the contract explicitly names these 
individuals as fiduciaries, then there will be no need for further discussion, and the court can proceed to step 
three infra. See In re Luna, 406 F.3d 1192, 1202 (10th Cir. 2005) (“Assessing whether a person is a named 
fiduciary under the terms of a plan is, of course, a straightforward inquiry. Deciding whether a person has 
assumed functional or de facto fiduciary status, however, is a more difficult exercise.”). This Comment will 
assume, however, that the individuals charged with making employer contributions were not designated as 
fiduciaries in the governing agreement. 
 224 29 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012). 
 225 In re Luna, 406 F.3d at 1201; see 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A). 
 226 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A)(i). 
 227 Id. § 1002(21)(A)(iii). 
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investment advice, administrative control over a plan, advising on whom to 
retain as legal or investment advisors to a plan, and, ultimately, how to invest 
plan assets.”228 Thus, the relevant question becomes whether the owner, or 
potentially any officer or executive, exercised “control and authority” over the 
unpaid contributions.229 If so, then the individual satisfies the requirements of 
an ERISA fiduciary and becomes personally liable for the unpaid 
contributions.230 
The circuit courts are inconsistent in determining what forms of conduct 
constitute exercising “control and authority” over unpaid contributions, as 
decisions from the Second and Eleventh Circuits demonstrate. In Bricklayers 
& Allied Craftworkers Local 2 v. Moulton Masonry & Construction, the 
Second Circuit found that an individual exercises control or authority when 
that individual knowingly “determin[es] which of the company’s creditors 
w[ill] be paid or in what order.”231 Thus, if the individual controlling the 
company’s finances fails to make the monetary contributions owed to the 
funds, then the individual has sufficiently exercised control or authority over 
the unpaid contributions.232 That individual will therefore be held liable for the 
debt as an ERISA fiduciary.233  
In ITPE Pension Fund v. Hall, the Eleventh Circuit remanded the case to 
the district court to determine whether the parties intended for unpaid 
contributions to be plan assets.234 The court noted, however, that it would have 
followed an approach similar to the Second Circuit’s in Moulton Masonry if 
the contractual language had clearly stated that unpaid contributions were plan 
assets.235 
 
 228 In re Luna, 406 F.3d at 1201; see also Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 142–43 
(1985) (stating that ERISA fiduciary duties “relate to the proper management, administration, and investment 
of fund assets, the maintenance of proper records, the disclosure of specified information, and the avoidance of 
conflicts of interest”). 
 229 See ITPE Pension Fund v. Hall, 334 F.3d 1011, 1012 (11th Cir. 2003); 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A). 
 230 See Bricklayers & Allied Craftworkers Local 2 v. Moulton Masonry & Constr., LLC, 779 F.3d 182, 
188 (2d Cir. 2015). 
 231 Id. (quoting Finkel v. Romanowicz, 577 F.3d 79, 86 (2d. Cir. 2009)). 
 232 See id. at 189. 
 233 Id. 
 234 See Hall, 334 F.3d at 1016 (“If the district court finds that this section was clearly intended by the 
parties to make unpaid employer contributions assets of the Fund, then summary judgment . . . is not 
appropriate.”). 
 235 See id.  
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2. The Code: Construing “Fiduciary” Narrowly 
While the Code does not define “fiduciary,” the Supreme Court in Davis v. 
Aetna Acceptance Co. mandated that the term be construed “strict[ly] and 
narrow[ly].”236 Thus, unlike ERISA’s broad definition of “fiduciary,” the term 
has a much more limited meaning under the Code’s defalcation provision.237 
Because the receipt of a discharge is essential for facilitating a debtor’s fresh 
start, courts narrowly construe exceptions to discharge under the Code.238 
Commentators have interpreted Davis to provide “the framework for 
determining whether a debt arises from a fiduciary relationship that satisfies 
the fiduciary-capacity element of § 523(a)(4).”239 The Court stated, “[i]t is not 
enough that by the very act of wrongdoing out of which the contested debt 
arose, the bankrupt has become chargeable as a trustee ex maleficio. He must 
have been a trustee before the wrong and without reference thereto.”240 In other 
words, bankruptcy law demands that an individual’s fiduciary status predate 
any wrongdoing or debt that arises because of an action by the individual. The 
creation of the debt or an act of wrongdoing does not itself make the individual 
a fiduciary for purposes of § 523(a)(4). 
In contrast, the Sixth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have taken a drastically 
different approach when deciding the fiduciary status of a debtor in 
bankruptcy.241 The Tenth Circuit in In re Luna, when given the first 
opportunity to examine this issue in the bankruptcy context, declined to use the 
language governing the agreement to determine step one: the status of unpaid 
contributions; the court turned to the principles of property law instead.242 In 
doing so, the court still found that the unpaid contributions were plan assets, 
but only because the ERISA plan possessed “a future interest in the collection 
 
 236 293 U.S. 328, 333 (1934); see also Chapman v. Forsyth, 43 U.S. 202, 208 (1844) (holding that a factor 
who retains the money of his principal is not a fiduciary debtor under bankruptcy law because the law “speaks 
of technical trusts and not those which the law implies from contract”). See generally Emil Khatchatourian & 
Brendan M. Gage, Unpaid ERISA Contributions and Fiduciary Liability Under § 523(a)(4), 32 AM. BANKR. 
INST. J., Nov. 2013 at 52, Westlaw, 32-Nov. Am. Bankr. Inst. J. 52.  
 237 Khatchatourian & Gage, supra note 236, at 52.  
 238 See In re Stone, 91 B.R. 589, 591 (D. Utah 1988) (“A central purpose of bankruptcy legislation is to 
provide the debtor with comprehensive relief from the burden of his debts by discharging virtually all financial 
obligations. Therefore, courts have narrowly construed exceptions to discharge in favor of the debtor in order 
to not frustrate this fundamental policy . . . .”). 
 239 Khatchatourian & Gage, supra note 236, at 52. 
 240 Davis, 293 U.S. at 333; see also Upshur v. Briscoe, 138 U.S. 365, 378 (1891) (“The language would 
seem to apply only to a debt created by a person who was already a fiduciary when the debt was created.”). 
 241 See Bos v. Bd. of Trs., 795 F.3d 1006, 1011–12 (9th Cir. 2015); In re Bucci, 493 F.3d 635, 643 (6th 
Cir. 2007); In re Luna, 406 F.3d 1192, 1201 (10th Cir. 2005). 
 242 406 F.3d at 1199. 
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of the contractually owed contributions.”243 Thus, when deciding if an 
individual debtor exercised authority or control over the unpaid contributions, 
the court held that such a finding would be improbable.244  
By this logic, the trustees of the plan, not the debtor, controlled the 
contractual right to collect the unpaid contributions from the debtor.245 The 
plan trustees’ right to “enforce their contractual rights is entirely up to [them]; 
the [debtors], meanwhile, have no say over whether this right will be enforced 
or not.”246 In reaching this decision, the court stated that “ERISA’s definition 
of ‘fiduciary’ is broad but . . . Congress did not intend [for discretion alone to 
trigger fiduciary status], for it would . . . undermine the very purpose of ERISA 
by creating an enormous disincentive to offer an employee-benefit fund or 
contract with one.”247 
Two years later, the Sixth Circuit in In re Bucci advanced the notion that a 
debtor’s status as an ERISA fiduciary is different from its status as a fiduciary 
under the defalcation provision of the Code.248 The court determined that to be 
a fiduciary under § 523(a)(4), “the alleged fiduciary must have duties that 
preexist the act creating the debt.”249 Thus, while an individual’s decision to 
refrain from making required payments to the funds is enough to trigger 
fiduciary status under ERISA, this decision, without more, is unable to make 
the debtor a fiduciary for purposes of § 523(a)(4).250 This interpretation of 
“fiduciary” is consistent with the court’s long history of “constru[ing] the term 
‘fiduciary capacity’ found in the defalcation provision of § 523(a)(4) more 
narrowly than the term is used in other circumstances.”251 
In 2015, the Ninth Circuit in Bos v. Board of Trustees agreed with the 
Tenth Circuit’s holding in In re Luna by finding that unpaid contributions are 
“more appropriately classified as the contractual right to bring a claim against 
the employer for delinquent payments if the payments are in fact never 
made.”252 Thus, the “control or authority” over the asset belongs to the plan 
 
 243 See id. 
 244 See id. at 1202. 
 245 See id.  
 246 See id.  
 247 See id. at 1208. 
 248 493 F.3d 635, 643 (6th Cir. 2007). 
 249 Id. 
 250 See id. 
 251 Id. at 639. 
 252 Bos v. Bd. of Trs., 795 F.3d 1006, 1011 (9th Cir. 2015). 
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trustees, not the employer.253 Further, and coinciding with the court’s “limited 
approach . . . in recognizing fiduciary status . . . in the § 523(a)(4) context,” it 
also found merit in the Sixth Circuit’s reasoning, which distinguished the 
definition of an ERISA fiduciary from a fiduciary for purposes of 
§ 523(a)(4).254 
3. Two Become One 
Because the fundamental purpose of bankruptcy law is to facilitate a fresh 
start for the honest but unfortunate debtor, scholars have argued that “[t]he 
Davis fiduciary analysis must be distinguished from ERISA’s definition of a 
fiduciary.”255 While this argument has merit, it ultimately threatens and 
disfavors the protections afforded to employees under ERISA. Thus, the issue 
necessarily becomes one of reconciliation. What are courts to do in the face of 
conflicting federal laws and social policies? While “[t]here is no way to predict 
with certainty how the Court [would] resolve a conflict between competing 
federal laws . . . [t]he resolution of this conflict usually depends on whether the 
majority of Justices view the question presented primarily from the perspective 
of bankruptcy law or non-bankruptcy law.”256 The Supreme Court should view 
the “fiduciary conflict” primarily from the perspective of ERISA.257 In other 
words, the Court should insist on a presumption of consistent usage for the 
term “fiduciary” for purposes of ERISA and the Code to give employees an 
opportunity to fight another day in this uphill battle. 
In recent decades, “the [Supreme] Court has decided a few cases resolving 
the conflict between bankruptcy law and pension law.”258 While both laws 
serve important policies and functions, the Court “has uniformly resolved these 
conflicting policies in favor of the pension law . . . .” In Patterson v. Shumate, 
the Court held that “an ERISA-qualified pension plan may be excluded from 
 
 253 See id. at 1011–12. 
 254 See id. at 1011. 
 255 Khatchatourian & Gage, supra note 236, at 52. But see In re Fahey, 482 B.R. 678, 695 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 
2012) (“[W]here the debt arises from an ERISA fiduciary acting in his fiduciary capacity under that statute, 
then § 523(a)(4)’s ‘fiduciary capacity’ requirement will be met.”); In re Duncan, 331 B.R. 70, 82 (Bankr. 
E.D.N.Y. 2005) (“[I]t seems reasonable and appropriate to look to ERISA’s definition of a fiduciary in order to 
assess whether the requirement of fiduciary capacity has been met.”). 
 256 KENNETH N. KLEE, BANKRUPTCY AND THE SUPREME COURT 60 (2008). 
 257 See In re Duncan, 331 B.R. at 82 (“[I]t is routine to give meaning to Bankruptcy Code terms by 
reference to non-bankruptcy law.”). See infra discussion step three, applying § 523(a)(4) and ultimately 
determining whether the unpaid contributions will be a nondischargeable debt. 
 258 KLEE, supra note 256, at 80. 
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the property of the bankruptcy estate pursuant to § 541(c)(2).”259 While this 
decision undoubtedly limits a creditor’s ability to reach a debtor’s assets, the 
Court’s ruling preserves an individual’s retirement benefits. This holding is 
“consistent with both bankruptcy and ERISA policies” because, in theory, a 
creditor will benefit from the assets that comprise property of the debtor’s 
estate.260 The Court’s opinion effectively furthered three important ERISA 
polices: “[1] no exceptions to ERISA’s anti-alienation provisions; [2] ERISA’s 
goal of protecting pension benefits; and [3] uniform national treatment of 
pension benefits.”261 The third policy the Court listed is by far the most 
important ERISA goal, for without uniform national treatment of pension 
benefits, we regress as a society and fail the American worker.262 
Courts’ insistence on separating the meaning of fiduciary in the bankruptcy 
context from its meaning under ERISA is unnecessary and confusing. On the 
one hand, it is important for courts to construe § 523(a)(4) narrowly. When an 
individual employer files for bankruptcy, certainly “Congress [did not mean] to 
impose fiduciary obligations on all employer-contributors.”263 In bankruptcy, 
“unless [the debtor] has violated some norm of behavior specified [under the 
Code],” the law attempts to contrive the best way for the parties involved to 
move forward.264 Thus, “the principal advantage bankruptcy offers an 
individual lies in the benefits associated with discharge.”265 If the court 
deprives a debtor of a discharge, then it robs the debtor of the opportunity to 
rebuild. 
On the other hand, “it is important to have a uniform interpretation of 
federal law.”266 While bankruptcy law contains its own unique set of 
circumstances, procedures, and policies, there is no need for “fiduciary” to 
have a different meaning within this context. “Uniform treatment . . . by both 
state and federal courts within a State serves to reduce uncertainty, to 
discourage forum shopping, and to prevent a party from receiving ‘a windfall 
merely by reason of the happenstance of bankruptcy.’”267 Thus, courts should 
 
 259 504 U.S. 753, 765 (1992).  
 260 KLEE, supra note 256, at 88; see Patterson, 504 U.S. at 758. 
 261 KLEE, supra note 256, at 88; see Patterson, 504 U.S. at 764–65 (emphasis added). 
 262 See supra notes 39–44 and accompanying text.  
 263 In re Luna, 406 F.3d 1192, 1208 (10th Cir. 2005). 
 264 Jackson, supra note 23, at 1393.  
 265 Id. 
 266 Bullock v. BankChampaign, N.A., 133 S. Ct. 1754, 1761 (2013). 
 267 Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979) (quoting Lewis v. Mfrs. Nat’l Bank, 364 U.S. 603, 609 
(1961)). 
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extend the reasoning of both the Second and Eleventh Circuits so that the 
ERISA definition of “fiduciary” is preserved in the bankruptcy context. In 
other words, “being an ERISA fiduciary is sufficient to satisfy the fiduciary 
capacity requirement of § 523(a)(4).”268 
It is important to remember that Congress, “prompted by public outcry over 
inadequacies in the private pension system, enacted ERISA as a means of 
protecting employees’ retirement income.”269 ERISA’s objectives are “to 
increase the number of pension plan participants and to assure that participants 
receive their benefits.”270 To achieve this goal, “ERISA’s declared policy is to 
protect the interests of participants through the creation of standards for 
disclosure, fiduciary obligations, vesting, funding and plan termination 
insurance.”271 ERISA is a broad, remedial statute that addresses violations with 
both civil remedies and criminal penalties.272 Thus, to declare that contract law 
is an employee’s best and only means to receive unpaid contributions 
undermines the very purpose of ERISA and the efforts of Congress in passing 
such a complex and remedial statute. 
By giving ERISA the broad interpretation it deserves, courts should 
consider an individual who possesses the ability to refrain from making 
payments owed to the funds an ERISA fiduciary. When such an individual 
neglects to pay the funds, and, in turn, directs the money elsewhere, he or she 
is absolutely “exercis[ing] . . . discretionary authority or discretionary control 
respecting management of such plan or . . . disposition of its asset.”273 While 
this broad interpretation undoubtedly places great responsibility on employers, 
it does so only “to the extent that . . . an employer freely accept[ed] [such a 
responsibility] in collective bargaining.”274 If, after weighing the risks, the 
employer does not wish to take on such responsibility, then the employer 
should, during the bargaining process, object to the inclusion of any language 
in the agreement classifying unpaid contributions as plan assets. As indicated 
 
 268 In re Bucci, 493 F.3d 635, 640 (6th Cir. 2007); see In re Hemmeter, 242 F.3d 1186 (9th Cir. 2001) 
(holding that “an ERISA fiduciary is also a fiduciary under § 523(a)(4)”); see also In re Duncan, 331 B.R. 70, 
82 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2005); Weaver v. Weston (In re Weston), 307 B.R. 340, 343 (Bankr. D.N.H. 2004); 
Morgan v. Musgrove (In re Musgrove), 187 B.R. 808, 814 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1995). 
 269 Gail Cagney, Note, Corporate Officers as Employers: Eristic Liability Under ERISA, 52 BROOK. L. 
REV. 1211, 1212 (1987). 
 270 Id. at 1214. 
 271 Id. 
 272 Id. at 1215. 
 273 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A)(i) (2012). 
 274 ITPE Pension Fund v. Hall, 334 F.3d 1011, 1014 (11th Cir. 2003) (citing NYSA-ILA Med. & Clinical 
Servs. Fund ex rel. Capo v. Catucci, 60 F. Supp. 2d 194, 201 (S.D.N.Y. 1999)). 
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in step one, if unpaid contributions are not plan assets, then the delinquent 
employer cannot be imputed fiduciary duties within this context. Thus, this 
approach increases employees’ chances of receiving the money owed to their 
retirement accounts, while also protecting employers from an overarching 
statute assigning liability not agreed upon by the parties.275 
Assigning fiduciary status to an individual who has knowingly failed to 
make contributions to employee benefit funds does not, in and of itself, make 
that individual’s debt nondischargeable in bankruptcy.276 Thus, as the Supreme 
Court noted in Patterson, such a construction would be “consistent with both 
bankruptcy and ERISA policies.”277 This broader definition of fiduciary simply 
safeguards the purpose of ERISA, which is to ensure that employees receive 
the benefits they deserve.278 Under this approach, courts can and should 
prevent debtors who willfully breached279 fiduciary duties to their employees 
from having the unpaid contributions discharged in bankruptcy. At the same 
time, courts will remain able to protect the honest debtor from his creditors 
because of the Supreme Court’s narrow reading of the defalcation provision 
discussed in the next section. 
C. The Defalcation Provision and Nondischargeable Debts 
The third and final step for courts to determine is whether the debtor is 
liable for defalcation. To reach this point, the court must have done two things: 
(1) found unambiguous language in the CBA that makes unpaid contributions 
plan assets; and (2) preserved the definition of fiduciary under ERISA by 
 
 275 See id. at 1015 (quoting Herman v. NationsBank Tr. Co., 126 F.3d 1354, 1366 (11th Cir. 1997)). The 
court stated: 
If ERISA did not limit the definition of fiduciaries to those with knowledge of their authority and 
discretion, then persons or entities could become subject to fiduciary liability without notice. 
Such a result would not only be unfair, but it would also disserve a core purpose of ERISA, 
which is to create a system whereby accountable fiduciaries are motivated by their accountability 
to protect the interests of participants in ERISA plans. 
Id. 
 276 See In re Duncan, 331 B.R. 70, 82 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2005) (“[I]n the Section 523(a)(4) context, it 
seems reasonable and appropriate to look to ERISA’s definition of a fiduciary in order to assess whether the 
requirement of fiduciary capacity has been met. This does not mean that every debt arising from or related to 
an ERISA violation by an ERISA fiduciary will be excepted from discharge by Section 523(a)(4). But where 
the debt arises from an ERISA fiduciary acting in his or her fiduciary capacity under the statute, then Section 
523(a)(4)’s requirement that the debtor act in a fiduciary capacity will be met.”). 
 277 Patterson v. Shumate, 504 U.S. 753, 758 (1992); see KLEE, supra note 256, at 88. 
 278 See Cagney, supra note 269, at 1214. 
 279 See Bullock v. BankChampaign, N.A., 133 S. Ct. 1754, 1759 (2013). 
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extending it to the bankruptcy proceeding. In other words, the debtor has 
knowingly refrained from making contributions to the employee benefit funds 
and has been imputed fiduciary status under ERISA, which the court agrees to 
recognize in bankruptcy. Courts should determine whether the debtor is liable 
for defalcation on a case-by-case basis after evaluating the totality of the 
circumstances and by keeping in mind the purposes of both ERISA and the 
Code.280 
Denying a discharge for a debt created by an individual’s improper conduct 
has a long history in American jurisprudence.281 The term “defalcation” first 
appeared in bankruptcy law in 1841 to prohibit the discharge of debts “created 
in consequence of a defalcation as a public officer; or as executor, 
administrator, guardian or trustee, or while acting in any other fiduciary 
capacity.”282 In Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. v. Herbst, Judge Learned 
Hand famously stated: “Colloquially, perhaps the word, ‘[d]efalcation,’ 
ordinarily implies some moral dereliction, but in th[e] context [of the 1841 
Act] it may have included innocent defaults, so as to include all fiduciaries 
who for any reason were short in their accounts.”283 However, Judge Hand 
noted that the Supreme Court in Chapman v. Forsyth limited the meaning of 
fiduciary to “special” or “technical” fiduciaries.284  
The Bankruptcy Act of 1867 simplified the existing defalcation provision 
to “defalcation as a public officer, or while acting in any fiduciary 
character.”285 Additionally, the 1867 Act expanded the defalcation provision to 
any “debt created by the fraud or embezzlement of the bankrupt” directly 
before the defalcation provision.286 With these revisions, Judge Hand pondered 
that “[w]hatever was the original meaning of ‘defalcation,’ it must here have 
covered other defaults than deliberate malversations, else it added nothing to 
 
 280 See Cagney, supra note 269, at 1214; Jackson, supra note 23, at 1393 (“THE principal advantage 
bankruptcy offers an individual lies in the benefits associated with discharge.”). 
 281 See Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co. v. Herbst, 93 F.2d 510, 511 (2d Cir. 1937) (“Under the Act of 1800 
. . . a discharge relieved bankrupts of all their debts without exception, provided they conducted themselves 
properly; but the statute applied only to those engaged in commerce and was confined to involuntary 
bankruptcies.”). In 1841, Congress extended this reasoning to voluntary bankruptcy proceedings. Id. (Ch. 9, 
§ 4, 5 Stat. 440, 443 (1841) (repealed 1843) [hereinafter 1841 Act]). 
 282 Id. (citing 1841 Act, § 1, 5 Stat. at 441). 
 283 Id. 
 284 Id. (citing Chapman v. Forsyth, 43 U.S. 202, 208 (1844)); see supra notes 236–240 and accompanying 
text (discussing the Supreme Court’s interpretation of “fiduciary” for bankruptcy purposes). 
 285 Cent. Hanover Bank, 93 F.2d at 511 (emphasis added) (citing Bankruptcy Act of 1867, ch. 176, § 33, 
14 Stat. 517, 533 (amended 1874 and repealed 1878) [hereinafter 1867 Act]). 
 286 1867 Act, ch. 176, § 33, 14 Stat. at 533; see Cent. Hanover Bank, 93 F.2d at 511.  
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the words, ‘fraud or embezzlement.’”287 Thus, Judge Hand’s “interpretation of 
defalcation created an ambiguity regarding the level of culpability required to 
constitute defalcation.”288 Within the midst of such ambiguity, however, Judge 
Hand presents a compelling argument that the standard for defalcation may 
have been much broader than the narrow reading the provision receives from 
courts today. 
Congress enacted § 523(a)(4) of the Code to punish the dishonest debtor 
and, when appropriate, this provision gives the court the ability to find that 
debt arising from unpaid contributions is not dischargeable in a fiduciary 
debtor’s bankruptcy proceeding.289 Section 523(a)(4) “does not discharge an 
individual debtor from any debt for fraud or defalcation while acting in a 
fiduciary capacity, embezzlement, or larceny.”290 In Bullock v. 
BankChampaign, N.A., the Supreme Court considered the scope of the term 
“defalcation” and held that defalcation “includes a culpable state of mind 
requirement akin to that which accompanies application of the other terms in 
the same statutory phrase.”291 The Court described the state of mind 
requirement “as one involving knowledge of, or gross recklessness in respect 
to, the improper nature of the relevant fiduciary behavior.”292 In other words, 
“where the conduct at issue does not involve bad faith, moral turpitude, or 
other immoral conduct, the term requires an intentional wrong.”293 Intentional 
conduct is both “conduct that the fiduciary knows is improper [and] reckless 
conduct of the kind that the criminal law often treats as the equivalent.”294 For 
the conduct to be reckless, the fiduciary must engage in a conscious disregard 
for, or willful blindness to, “a substantial and unjustifiable risk” that his 
conduct “will turn out to violate a fiduciary duty.”295 
The Court reasoned that this interpretation “is also consistent with a set of 
statutory exceptions that Congress normally confines to circumstances where 
strong, special policy considerations, such as the presence of fault, argue for 
preserving the debt, thereby benefiting, for example, a typically more honest 
 
 287 Id. 
 288 Elizabeth Vanderlinde, Intentional Conduct May Be Required to Prove Defalcation Under Section 
523(a)(4) in Certain Circuits, 4 ST. JOHN’S BANKR. RESEARCH LIBR. NO. 28, at 2 (2012). 
 289 See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4) (2012); McElligott Jr. & Wynne, supra note 97. 
 290 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4). 
 291 133 S. Ct. 1754, 1757 (2013). 
 292 Id. 
 293 Id. at 1759. 
 294 Id. 
 295 Id. 
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creditor.”296 The Court noted that “[i]n the absence of fault, it is difficult to find 
strong policy reasons favoring a broader exception here.”297 Thus, a court 
should find a debtor who was acting in a fiduciary capacity liable for 
defalcation on a case-by-case basis after evaluating the totality of the 
circumstances. 
The bar for satisfying defalcation is high,298 and as such, an individual 
employer who simply forgets to make one payment to an employee benefit 
fund will not reach that bar. Since this Comment advocates for courts to take a 
new approach when evaluating whether an individual debtor is guilty of 
defalcation for failing to make contributions to employee benefit funds, it is 
difficult to determine precisely what factors need to be present for a court to 
declare the debt nondischargeable in bankruptcy. Arguably, an individual’s 
decision to refrain from making the required payments to the funds is 
intentional conduct that “the fiduciary knows is improper.”299 Bullock 
demands, however, that the intentional conduct also be reckless of the kind 
punishable by criminal law.300 Thus, this requirement is one that courts can use 
to truly protect an honest but unfortunate debtor in bankruptcy. 
In bankruptcy, courts should look for factors mitigating the debtor’s act of 
nonpayment. Why is the debtor delinquent in making the required 
contributions? Where did the money go instead? What does the financial 
picture of the debtor’s business look like? When did events take a turn for the 
worse? Has the debtor done anything to remedy the situation? If courts ask 
questions such as these when determining if a debtor is guilty of defalcation, 
they can discern a clearer picture of the debtor’s character and habits. Did the 
debtor take his fiduciary duties seriously, or did he disregard completely any 
responsibilities or obligations owed to the employee benefit funds for personal 
gain? If the court determines the latter to be true, then it should hold the 
debtor’s unpaid contributions nondischargeable in bankruptcy.301 
 
 296 Id. at 1761. 
 297 Id. 
 298 See id. at 1759. 
 299 Id. 
 300 Id. 
 301 See id. at 1761 (stating that “circumstances where strong, special policy considerations, such as the 
presence of fault, argue for preserving the debt, thereby benefiting, for example, a typically more honest 
creditor”). 
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CONCLUSION 
This three-step approach preserves the contractual intent of the parties to 
make unpaid contributions plan assets of multiemployer pension plans; gives 
“fiduciary” a consistent meaning under both ERISA and the Code; and makes 
unpaid contributions a nondischargeable debt when a court holds a dishonest 
debtor liable for defalcation. While this three-step approach certainly will not 
eliminate every problem in this ongoing battle, it will give employees an 
opportunity to fight another day.302 If courts elect to adopt this approach, 
trustees representing the employees must engage in a cost–benefit analysis to 
determine if litigation is the correct course of action. There is no guarantee that 
the debtor will be able to pay the employee benefit funds even if all three steps 
set forth in this Comment are easily satisfied, for one cannot get blood from a 
stone. This idiom unfortunately remains true even for the worst, most 
despicable stones. Further, if the debtor can pay some money to the funds, will 
the amount outweigh the costs of litigating the case? This is an important 
question, but it is one every individual weighs before entering our judicial 
system. The choice to litigate belongs to the people. When a court either 
refuses to acknowledge an employer’s unpaid contributions as plan assets or 
fails to extend ERISA’s definition of “fiduciary” to a bankruptcy proceeding, it 
deprives the employee of his or her choice whether to litigate because he or she 
will automatically lose every time. Thus, this three-step approach provides the 
best chance for employees to receive unpaid contributions while 
simultaneously furthering the purposes of ERISA and the spirit of the Code. 
As of March 2015, “[e]mployer-provided retirement benefits were 
available to 31% of private industry workers in the lowest wage category (the 
10th percentile).”303 Further, “88 percent of workers in the highest wage 
category (the 90th percentile) had access to retirement benefits.”304 These 
employees count on their employers to hold up their end of the bargain and 
make the required contributions to employee benefit funds. If employers fail to 
do so, then the aggrieved employees have no choice but to rely on the courts 
for the justice they deserve. In a society where 55% of Americans “break even 
or spend more than they make each month,” the majority of households “do 
 
 302 See Thomas H. Jackson, Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, and the Creditors’ Bargain, 91 
YALE L.J. 857, 858 (1982) (“[T]he claimants who fare best in the bankruptcy process hold special entitlements 
under applicable non-bankruptcy law.”). 
 303 John Sullivan, Two-Thirds of Workers Have Access to Retirement Benefits: DOL, 401KSPECIALIST 
(July 29, 2015), https://401kspecialistmag.com/two-thirds-of-workers-have-access-to-retirement-benefits-dol/.  
 304 Id. 
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not consider themselves ready for a sudden financial setback.”305 Thus, when 
courts (1) reject the language in agreements classifying unpaid contributions as 
plan assets, (2) fail to extend the definition of an ERISA fiduciary to the 
bankruptcy context, or (3) ultimately find the dishonest fiduciary not guilty of 
defalcation, they may be facilitating more bankruptcy filings—ones filed by 
the employees because of their employer’s disregard for his or her fiduciary 
duties. 
A court may ultimately find that the fiduciary debtor did not engage in a 
conscious disregard for, or willful blindness to, “a substantial and unjustifiable 
risk” that would cause the debtor to breach a fiduciary duties and be guilty of 
defalcation.306 In fact, perhaps the debtor is a sympathetic debtor like Joyce and 
Mark Luna who “turned over for [the company’s] benefit approximately 
$43,000 from [a personal] IRA . . . $7,000 in savings bonds, none of which 
[the company] ever repaid . . . and a $30,000 [personal loan] from a local 
bank” in attempts to keep the company afloat for everyone involved.307 In a 
situation like this one, it would be illogical to hold the debtor’s large debts 
arising from unpaid contributions nondischargeable under § 523(a)(4). 
Sometimes, unforeseen financial tragedies occur despite our best efforts. The 
Code exists for this reason—“to grant a fresh start to the honest but unfortunate 
debtor.”308 
But, “it is unlikely that Congress would have fashioned a proof standard 
that favored an interest in giving the perpetrators of fraud a fresh start over an 
interest in protecting the victims of fraud.”309 Not all fiduciary debtors will be 
as sympathetic as the Lunas. There will be, and likely have been, fiduciary 
debtors who meet the defalcation standard laid out by the Supreme Court in 
Bullock.310 They will possess “a culpable state of mind . . . involving 
knowledge of, or gross recklessness in respect to, the improper nature of the 
relevant fiduciary behavior” and will have engaged in “conduct that the 
 
 305 Associated Press, More than HALF of Americans still break even or live beyond their means each 
month, DAILY MAIL (Feb. 27, 2015, 4:43 PM), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2971021/Pew-study-
Americans-stressed-despite-improved-economy.html; see also Abby Hayes, Why You Should Never Try to 
Keep Up with the Joneses, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.: MY MONEY (Apr. 10, 2015, 8:30 AM), 
http://money.usnews.com/money/blogs/my-money/2015/04/10/why-you-should-never-try-to-keep-up-with-
the-joneses (“Many Americans live beyond their means.”). 
 306 See Bullock, 133 S. Ct. at 1759. 
 307 In re Luna, 406 F.3d 1192, 1197 (10th Cir. 2005). 
 308 Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 286 (1991). 
 309 Id. at 279. 
 310 See Bullock, 133 S. Ct. at 1757–59. 
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fiduciary knows is improper.”311 It is a civil disservice for courts to 
preemptively fail to extend the reasoning of the Second and Eleventh Circuits 
to bankruptcy proceedings. If courts continue on this path, they will ensure that 
fraudulent actions go unpunished because they will have eliminated the 
employees’ avenue to hold fiduciary debtors accountable when the appropriate 
fact patterns arise. 
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